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Abstract: Smart Grid (SG), components with historical set of security challenges, becomes more vulnerable because 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) has its own share of problems while Cloud infrastructure 
adds yet another unpredicted layer of threats. Scalability and availability, which are strong aspects of the cloud 
platform making it attractive to users, also attracts security threats for the same reasons. The malware installed 
on single host offers very limited scope compared to attack magnitude that compromised Cloud platform can 
offer. Therefore, the strongest aspect of Cloud itself becomes a nightmare in Cloud-Based SG. A breach in 
such a delicate system can cause severe consequences including interruption of electricity, equipment damage, 
data breach, complete blackouts, or even life-threatening consequences. We mimic Denial-of-Service (DoS) 
attacks to demonstrate interruption of electricity in SG with open-source solution to co-simulate power and 
communication systems.
1 INTRODUCTION 
SG promises reduced energy consumption, lower 
production cost and robust transmission with 
intelligent distribution. SGs are exposed to a 
distinctive set of security threats because two 
different systems of Power Electronics and ICT are 
integrated to form a system with single core function: 
“Uninterruptable and Cost-Effective Energy Supply”. 
At the writing of this draft, not a single country has a 
true and complete SG setup in place. Beside the 
ordinary cost issues of installations or upgrading 
existing systems; critical question of reliability is 
unanswered. Cyber security for SG is of immense 
concern because of emerging cyber-threats and 
security incidents targeting smart grids all over the 
world. These threats are severe and obvious in SG 
systems if deployed without appropriate 
measurements. A cyber-attack at Maroochy Shire 
resulted in the release of untreated water and attack 
on Davis-Besse nuclear plant, USA, disabled the 
safety system (Yang, 2011). Stuxnet worm attack at 
Iran’s nuclear power station halted the work and a 
a  https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6255-6966 
recent bug termed as ‘HeartBleed’ in OpenSSL has 
initiated debate in the research community for 
dedicated security measures and re-assessment of 
user grade software solutions for multibillion national 
assets such as power grids. 
Existing security measurements are insufficiently 
scalable, incompatible, or simply inadequate to 
address the challenges posed by highly complex 
environments such as smart grid. Below are the 
possible security threats originated by DoS attacks 
and general aspects of toolsets to emulate such 
models in terms of usability, extensibility, and 
accuracy 
1.1 Security and Privacy in Physical 
Grid 
The performance of power grid considerably relies on 
the actual physical devices and deployed 
environment; therefore, devices should be critically 
designed to sustain adverse environmental factors 
(Stouffer and Falco, 2006) and possible brutal force 
attacks. Master terminal units (MTUs) and remote 
172
Razaq, A., Hussain, M., Javed, W., Javed, T. and Memon, Z.
Detection and Prevention of Denial-of-Service in Cloud-based Smart Grid.
DOI: 10.5220/0010449901720179
In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Smart Cities and Green ICT Systems (SMARTGREENS 2021), pages 172-179
ISBN: 978-989-758-512-8
Copyright c© 2021 by SCITEPRESS – Science and Technology Publications, Lda. All rights reserved
terminal units (RTUs) controlling programmable 
logic controllers (PLCs) from generation to 
transmission systems require strict timing to control 
the demand and supply of electricity. Automation in 
SG is commonly accomplished with Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system. 
SCADA devices are real-time or non-real-time 
(Muhammad and Siddique, 2020) small computer 
system that manipulates electrical outputs based on 
the condition of electrical input signals and program 
logic.  In theory, these systems consist of Human 
Machine Interface (HMI) situated in operation 
facilities which are part of MTU. MTU is used to 
monitor RTU which is eventually connected to PLC 
for automation (Liu and Xiao, 2012). Data 
communication between RTUs and MTU occurs over 
wired telephone lines or wireless cellular 
technologies. 
1.2 Security and Privacy in Information 
and Communications Technology 
ICT provided necessary communication means and 
protocols for control and data exchange in SG. 
Security of interconnected devices and subsystems is 
important, but it should not result in a degraded and 
unreliable system. Efficiency and reliability should be 
achieved with only secure and completive open 
solutions (Hahn and Member, 2013). The (Bou-Harb, 
2013) investigated communication in distributed 
networks and smart meters.  They suggest that 
distributed devices and applications should follow 
design objectives including device authentication, 
data confidentiality, message integrity, prevention 
mechanism for cyber-attacks and facilitating 
communication overhead. 
Historically (Galloway and Hancke, 2013), 
control in industrial automation was done 
mechanically with hydraulic controllers or manually. 
These mechanical components were upgraded once 
electronics such as transducers, relays and hard-wired 
control circuits became available. This changed to 
new dimensions when small microcontrollers were 
introduced which would allow smaller size and ability 
to connect over wire or wireless. Electronics based 
digital systems are able to remotely control and 
monitor various power grid components with various 
connectivity means and communication protocols. 
These communications protocols are commonly 
referred to as fieldbus protocols. Various protocols 
and technologies are being used in traditional power 
grids for networking purpose such as ModBus,  
ModBus+, ProfiBus, ICCP, DNP3, PROFINET, 
INTERBUS, WorldFIP, etc.  It is important to note 
that all these were designed without considering 
cyber security. Existing deployed communication 
protocols were developed under the umbrella of 
IEEE, IEC and DNP3. IEC 60870-5 and DNP3 are 
considered most widely used protocols in the 
automation industry. IEC is typically used in 
European countries and recognized by IEEE 1379 
standard which is used in Asia and North America 
(Liu and Xiao, 2012).   
1.3 Security and Privacy in  
Cloud-based Smart Grid 
Cloud virtualization presents a logical view of 
resources while encapsulating heterogeneity, 
complexity, and distributed characteristics with 
unified interface. Cloud computing provides virtually 
aggregation of dispersed resources beside remote 
accessibility. The emerging technologies in Cloud 
based platforms present feasible solution for 
processing and storage thriving domains such as SG. 
Cloud-Based capability will allow ordinary resource 
limited devices in SG with low power CPU and 
limited memory to execute resource intensive 
security protocols. It is also important to note that 
Cloud platforms are prone to open access and 
anonymous attacks. 
Data and software in cloud resides on network 
which poses a unique set of security and privacy 
challenges to the system. A survey conducted by 
(Bera, 2015) provides comprehensive discussion on 
Cloud applications for SG in contrast to conventional 
solutions that exist without Cloud. Traditional 
solutions need point to point physical connection 
whereas cloud can provide virtual control of any node 
without any real physical connection or media. 
Similar (Genge and Beres, 2014) survey on existing 
cloud–based solutions for SG without any details on 
security criteria concludes that security in cloud 
storage, communication paths between Cloud with 
Grid and security within SG are basic system 
requirements.  
The (Markovic, 2013) provided comprehensive 
survey on cloud in SG. An interesting comparison is 
provided between conventional and smart grids and 
how cloud solutions can effectively apply in 
integration, reduced control latency, virtualized 
energy sources and load management. Study 
conducted on Los Angeles SG to address S&P in this 
development investigates software layers on various 
levels in cloud settings. The similar work is 
investigated by (Simmhan, 2011)and emphasis on 
data mining and aggregation of 1.4 million power 
customers in municipality of United States of 
America. Reporting, transporting, and storing huge 
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data (Bigdata) without native support of encryption 
can result in poor performance on Cloud platform. SG 
user applications should address privacy threats while 
utilizing datasets obtained continuously which 
represent user behaviour.  
A comprehensive report published by (Akyol, 
2012) under the umbrella of Department of Defence, 
United States concluded that power grids will 
eventually deploy cloud computing and this shift will 
be gradual only if the cyber security challenges are 
addressed. Report further recommends that utility 
providers must comply with NIST 2010 and NIST 
2011 cyber security requirements analysis and design 
methodologies. A mechanism implemented on 
Eucalyptus open-source platform by (Baek, 2014) 
based on ID, encryption and proxy validation 
provides an ideal solution. However, cascading of 
trust layers can prove to be dangerous if cooperating 
layer is compromised. Proposed Smart-Framework is 
interesting as far as it fulfils the trust criteria. 
The (Alcaraz, 2011) investigated this in very 
details of SCADA and how a virtual secure blanket 
can efficiently execute console to hardware 
commands with cryptic and efficiently. This virtual 
control not only provides access to resources but also 
guarantees scalability and availability with re-routing 
solutions for communication infrastructure. 
However, introducing virtual control layer over 
critical physical instalments would introduce latency 
which can result in fatal consequences.  Recently, 
(Armando, 2014) investigated smart metering data in 
cloud with attribute-based control model. They have 
used open-source Energy Home platform for 
proposed security framework. Solution partially 
addresses the security access problem assuming that 
data transportation and storage is secured. 
1.4 Denial-of-Service Threats in Smart 
Grid 
(He and Chan, 2014 ) proposed a mechanism based 
on MicaZ and TelosB motes to resist DoS attacks 
against adversaries and legitimate insiders. They 
suggest that public key infrastructure (PKI) is valid 
solution for uninterruptible service; however, 
deployment of PKI is directly proportional with cost 
for large scale networks such as SG. Different 
security protocols have been suggested depending 
upon the applications’ scalability and resources on 
board. (Lu and Wang,  2010) reviewed the security 
threats of DoS in DNP3 and classified these into three 
types: network availability, data integrity and 
information privacy, and evaluated their feasibility 
and impact on the smart grid.  
 (Liu, 2013) investigated DoS attacks on load 
frequency control (LFC) in SG while analysing 
dynamic performance of communication channels 
connected to RTUs in power systems. Case-studies of 
simulated DoS attacks were modelled as a switched 
(on/off) power system and two-area LFC theoretical 
model was built for different attack-launching 
instants. It has been concluded that adversaries can 
make power system unstable via DoS attacks if 
communication channels of RTUs are jammed. 
Similar work by (Liu and Chen, 2013) also 
investigated jamming threat but for wireless networks 
in the power systems. They suggested that traditional 
anti-jamming techniques can serve the purpose with 
additional measurements. A local controller with 
channel hoping is proposed to reduce possible DoS 
threats. 
In (Manandhar, 2014) investigated theory of false 
data injection (DoS) attacks in power systems and 
proposed Kalman Filter (KF). They suggest that DoS 
attacks can be averted with linear quadratic 
estimation (KF) detectors for sensors in SG such as 
PMUs which measure current phase and amplitude in 
power systems. The projected values by KF and 
incoming instant values can be compared to detect an 
anomaly in the system.  
Recently, (Sgouras, 2014) presented qualitative 
assessment of DoS attacks with simulation in 
OMNeT++ and INET framework. They examined 
performance of AMIs, routers and utility servers 
under such situation. An attack on AMI would result 
in minor consequences connected to single entity 
whereas similar scenarios for utility server would 
cause drastic effects during peak hours. Similar work 
was conducted by (Yi, Zhu,  2014) to demonstrate the 
impact of DoS in ICT without involving power grid 
simulation. They termed DoS attack as puppet attack 
which would penetrate in the system like warm and 
continue to congest the communication channels with 
false data until the network is exhausted. 
1.5 Cloud based Intrusion Detection 
System and Intrusion Prevention 
System in Smart Grid 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) with Intrusion 
Prevention System (IPS) or combined Intrusion 
Detection and Prevention System (IDPS) is a system 
which is meant to detect and prevent the unwanted 
activity. In a cloud environment where infrastructure 
and resources are in the form of services, a system of 
IDPS should also adopt service-oriented design.  
(Patel, 2013) presented a systematic review of 
existing IDPS techniques and how they are 
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insufficient for Cloud platform. Classic IDPSs are 
unable to address security challenges that are 
presented in mix-network-topology, multi-user, and 
mixture of software layers in Cloud platforms. 
(Mohamed and Adil, 2013) adopted to monitor 
system calls generated by virtual machine's programs 
to the hypervisor. This approach is limited to and 
false alarm would be huge problem if legitimate, but 
not-document application is executed. This technique 
also suffers with typical system overloading and 
lower throughput problem as monitoring all the 
systems calls and their call sequence. 
In Cloud computing IDS has its applicability on 
Virtual machine level. The (Alina, 2013) proposed a 
multilevel protection mechanism , the  system 
consists of front-end control and IDS on virtual 
machines. Authors claim to reduce number of false 
alarms with efficient detection of real threats. This 
approach short falls if trust system is compromised, a 
similar attack reported but with different weigh will 
be undetected. Recently, (Li and Sun, 2012) proposed 
anomaly-based solution with neural settings for 
artificially sensing the activity. Neural configuration 
helps to distribute the workload of IDS to spread 
algorithm across Cloud rather chocking a single 
machine. This technique of load balancing is natural 
as far as all entities share the same interest and 
participate with resources and time. The (Vaid and 
Verma, 2014) proposed IDPS based on user 
behaviour to detect malicious activities, the proposed 
system is meant to be implemented as SaaS layer of 
cloud. In (Maiti and Sivanesan, 2012) presented 
simple but practical implementation of Cloud based 
intrusion detection system. The presented idea 
provides a simple yet robust example how cloud-
based security service can leverage on vast resources 
for resource limited system.   
A researcher (Tupakula, 2011) elaborated design 
suggestions for virtual machine based IDPS targeted 
for IaaS. Proposed design will require continuous 
monitoring of operating systems calls and application 
logging , this method is not ideal for systems with 
strict timing needs and limited resources untilled data 
mining techniques are adopted. Researchers   
(Mehmood and Habiba, 2011) presented a 
comprehensive discussion on different solutions for 
Cloud security. Authors have suggested that IDS 
should utilize multiple or hybrid solutions for 
effective detection in Cloud security challenges. 
Recently,  (Prajapati, 2014) critically investigated 
classical solutions and concluded that databases of 
incident used to detect anomaly have low reliability. 
This approach drastically increases the database size 
and can introduce latency in monitor and detector 
functionality. (Sathya and Vasanthraj, 2013) also 
investigated Cloud based pattern matching IDPS and 
have introduced multilevel detection system. Their 
solution can suffer from overloading as auditing and 
logging will require ample resources and monitoring 
each activity will reduce overall system throughput.  
In section 1 evaluate existing work in literature 
review that encircles challenges presented in SG 
system from power systems to communication 
technologies and cloud. Section 1 also describes 
possible security threats originated by DoS attacks 
and general aspects of toolsets to emulate such 
models in terms of usability, extensibility, and 
accuracy. Section 2 represents a proposed technique. 
Finally, work in progress is presented in section 3 
with simulation of DoS in SG system for protected 
and insecure settings before concluding with 
discussion and future directions. 
2 PROPOSED TECHNIQUES 
In this section, we propose techniques to simulate 
DoS attack and methodologies adopted to address this 
attack (Abdul and Huaglory , 2016). Power and 
network architecture is presented with specifications 
of physical components and link layouts with 
functional configurations. Several solutions were 
evaluated as described in the literature review section. 
Most of these solutions simulate SG with a 
combination of network and power simulators (PS) 
based on commercial and open-source tools.  
Our proposed simulation uses NeSSi2 due to its 
open-source license and ability to simulate power and 
IP networks as a single application. NeSSi2 is a 
scenario and profile-based simulation tool. Each 
network in NeSSi2 consists of at least one scenario 
which is eventually profiled depending upon required 
simulation. A scenario defines type of profiles that 
can be deployed on each node of the network. 
Multiple profiles can be deployed on a single node 
within a single scenario. A profile is a component to 
provide a specific set of functionalities incorporating 
single or various features relevant to power and IP 
network simulation, which can be deployed onto SG 
nodes. Finally, profiled scenario requires a simulation 
component which allows the mapping of power and 
network domains while linking the corresponding 
entities. NeSSi2 is capable to generate various attack 
scenarios and traffic analysis.  
Figure 1 presents the high-level topology of 
proposed SG simulation for both networks.  Power 
network is represented on the left side with the 
corresponding IP network presented on the right side. 
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Power network consists of one generator and two 
consumption subnets representing insecure and 
secure gird configurations. Parallel IP network also 
consists of similar topology with server as a main 
subnet connected to insecure and secure subnets. 
Mapping between power and IP network is 
configurable on node level within the simulation. 
 
Figure 1: Proposed SG network topology. 
Detailed configuration of proposed power 
network based on is shown in figure 2. The power 
grid consists of green generation based on solar panel 
with output of 5147W. Two step-down transformers 
with varying current of 380kV to 220kV are in place 
between generation and consumption which depict 
transmission and distribution. These swing bus 
profiled transformers are eventually connected to two 
consumption local grids: “Secure” and “Protected.” 
As solar generation is considered unreliable, depends 
on surrounding environment, a swing bus is used 
between the links from solar panel to transmission 
transformer. Swing bus accommodates system losses 
by emitting or absorbing active/reactive power 
to/from the system. The transformer connected to 
insecure subnet is profiled with line failure profile to 
simulate the unviability of load during power 
interruption. Line failure profile of NeSSi2 allows 
simulating the load unavailability in target power line 
between required time intervals. This line failure 
profile only accepts a single power link and can be 
mapped to one instance of application. Consumption 
subnets further consists of one transformer and two 
smart houses. These smart houses are capable to 
simulate load consumption and are mapped to 
corresponding IP nodes in IP network for 
communication simulation. Smart houses are capable 
to emulate load usage depending upon time, weather, 
and number of persons.  
Configuration of proposed 100Mbps IP network 
is presented in Figure 3. Main subnet or Server subnet 
is connected to two subnets labelled as Insecure 
Subnet and Secure Subnet. Server node with Server 
subnet is profiled as Echo server application serving 
both connected subnets. 
Server subnet is connected to insecure subnet 
without any protection mechanism in place, whereas, 
secured subnet is connected via front-end firewall. 
Moreover, secured subnet deploys additional firewall 
at client's interface level in case router has been 
compromised by malicious activity. DoS attacks 
simulated via BOT component are presented in both 
insecure and secure subnets. The firewall alone is not 
a sufficient solution; an Intrusion Prevention System 
(IPS) along with Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
must be carefully designed and deployed side-by-side 
for complete protection. NeSSi2's firewall and packet 
sniffer profiles are very limited which results in 
restricted functionality. 
 
Figure 2: Power network layout. 
 
Figure 3: IP network layout. 
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3 SIMULATIONS OF  
DENIAL-OF-SERVICE 
ATTACKS AND DETECTIONS 
IN SMART GRID 
All nodes of IP network are configured with default 
load (echo client/server) at the beginning of 
simulation, but the packet flow is increased to 
demonstrate the packet loss which is turn depicts the 
DoS. DoS or inability to serve the legitimate 
incoming requests is a phenomenon where system’s 
capacity has reached its maximum throughput and 
prompts to unavailability of given service. Ability to 
handle DoS attacks is crucial due to the power electric 
grid’s strict availability requirements. Botnet attack is 
emulated in both secure and insecure networks for 
DoS attack. The BOT profile of NeSSi2 is limited to 
only specify the attack start time and can only target 
single IP node. All these IP nodes are mapped to 
smart houses in a power network with a one-to-one 
relationship, which means that a house in a power 
grid has a counterpart IP client in an IP network. 
This simulation is executed for 1000 ticks and 
failure or interruption of electricity and 
communication is simulated between 105-350, 500-
600 and 800-900 ticks (time intervals). A tick is the 
smallest possible time interval (event) in NeSSi2. The 
actual time length depends on the simulation, 
simulation mode and underlying hardware platform. 
The solar panel model is set to produce 5147W peak 
production whereas smart houses are simulated  for 5 
 
Figure 4: Server communication - secure and insecure 
subnets. 
 
Figure 5: Secure IP client. 
persons each with 0.90% consumption of received 
load.  
Figure 4 provides simulation statistics of 1000 
tick of server’s echo response to secure and insecure 
subnet nodes. The communication packets are 
presented along vertical axis whereas horizontal axis 
present numbers of ticks or simulation time itself. 
Interruption of insecure subnet is visible between 
failed intervals with less density of packets compared 
to tick intervals for secure subnet.  The successful or 
uninterrupted communication between server and 
secure subnet can be verified in figure 5 which 
demonstrated the continuous request sent by a secure 
client. 
Communication of insecure client is presented in 
Figure 6. Packet drop statistics marked with cyan 
colour simulates the failure scenario when client was 
under attack from BOT and failed to process the echo 
packets. Successful echo request is marked in yellow 
colour whereas packets in magenta colour represent 
forwarded packets. The successful and drop packets 
can be compared with server’s statistics which 
illustrates the fewer number of packets during failed 
communication of insecure client. These failed 
intervals can also be cross-checked in figure 7 which 
presents the load statistic of insecure smart house. 
The mapping between insecure client and smart house 
is done prior to simulation and smart house is profiled 
with smart house consumption profile along line 
failure profile on transformer link level. The 
corresponding IP client is profiled with echo client 
and device failure. 
 
Figure 6: Insecure IP client. 
 
Figure 7: Power interruption of insecure house. 
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4 DISCUSSION AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
Virtualization technologies in SG focus on 
availability, aggregation and accessibility of 
computing, storage, and network resources; without 
consideration of security. A shift to cloud-based SG 
is focused on the deliverability of services with 
respect to cost and throughput. However, security 
threats within these architectures not only remain the 
same but it is even more severe when deployed in a 
critical system of SG. Security in Cloud-based SG is 
complex because of its multi-layered nature. Which 
entity should be responsible for threat handling? Is it 
applications, devices, services, or infrastructure 
providers?  
DoS is an instinctive security threat which include 
hardware failure to service interruption. Efficiency to 
revert DoS without considerable change in QoS is 
important both during under-attack and afterwards. 
Detection and prevention are a set of a single security 
function divided into two conceptual sub-functions: 
IDS and IPS. These two distinguishable methods 
offer first line of defence in the event of DoS attack. 
DoS and IDPS are also directly proportional in terms 
of resources. The more intense the DoS attack, the 
greater the resources of processing and data mining 
techniques are required for IDPS. Cloud based 
security-as-a-service technique for IDPS overcomes 
this classic limitation.  
We examined the importance of SG for future 
energy requirements followed by detailed security 
challenges that are presented in Cloud Based SG 
systems. We demonstrated DoS attack and how this 
can cause the interruption of electricity while 
simulating the power and IP networks in parallel. We 
also simulated ICT configuration for SG security that 
can withstand DoS attack while ensuring the 
uninterruptible communication and power. Finally, 
we suggested that simulators for critical systems such 
as SG should be able to simulate defence techniques, 
including firewalls and IPS/IDS practices to avert 
possible attacks.   
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